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   Trade between Japan and the United States will continue to be crucial to 
world peace and prosperity well beyond the turn of the millennium. While 
creative and friendly governmental relations will help provide a positive 
background for commercial cooperation across the Pacific, the thousands of 
business people who conduct the day-today business transactions between 
companies in the two countries are the fundamental ingredients of the bilateral 
relationship. These thousands of managers, executives, and entrepreneurs in 
both Japan and America are the focus of this study. 
   The evidence that Japanese and American negotiation styles and behaviors 
differ is legion. With my own colleagues I have tried to identify the main areas 
of difference using interviews, field observations, and laboratory simulations, 
the last including questionnaires and videotaping (Graham 1993). Most of the 
work done on international negotiation styles, including my own, has been 
comparative in nature, involving intracultural negotiation settings. A few 
people have begun to address the issue of intercultural negotiations in a 
systematic way (e. g., Francis 1991, and Adler and Graham 1989), but really we 
know very little about how people behave when bargaining with foreigners. 
   Some of my most recent work has involved testing a model of the 
determinants of negotiation outcomes in fourteen countries, including Japan and 
the United States (Graham, Mintu, and Rodgers 1994 and Graham and Mintu-
Wimsatt 1996). The model "works" reasonably well, but often differently across 
the several countries. In all fourteen cases data collected in intracultural 
negotiations were used for the empirical tests. In the current study we have had 
forty-two Japanese and forty-two American business people participate in an 
intercultural negotiation simulation. Data were collected from "both sides of the 
table" and are used to test the theoretical model developed earlier. We can then 
compare the new intercultural results directly with those intracultural results 
reported previously toward building a better understanding of what happens 
                                241
John L. Graham
when differing negotiation styles mix. 
   The remainder of the paper is divided into five parts. First, based on the 
literature a few predictions are made regarding differences between inter-
cultural and intracultural settings. Next, the theoretical model is briefly 
described and hypotheses stated. The methods of the study are described in the 
third section. Results are reported in the fourth. The paper is concluded with a 
discussion and interpretation of the findings.
THE LITERATURE ON INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
   In their seminal article regarding international negotiation behaviors, 
Sawyer and Guetzkow were among the first to posit that negotiators' behaviors 
and outcomes can be influenced by situational constraints, i. e., intercultural 
negotiations versus intracultural negotiations : "The face-to-face conduct of 
negotiations may be influenced by behavioral discrepancies when persons of 
different cultural backgrounds are brought together." (1965, p. 502) 
   Support for their supposition has come from a broad array of disciplines. 
The interculturai communication and psychology literature suggests that people 
behave differently with members of their own culture than with members of 
foreign cultures. Research in nonbusiness contexts has demonstrated that when 
individuals interact with people from different cultures, the differences between 
them become salient (Bouchner and Ohsako 1977). Moreover, when people in 
interpersonal situations confront these actual differences, they tend to 
exaggerate them (Sherif and Hovland 1961 ; Vassiliou et al. 1972). 
   Mishler (1965) reports that in international exchanges : "The greater the 
cultural differences, the more likely barriers to communication and mis-
understandings become. Some researchers have even questioned whether 
"managers from significantly different cultures such as Japan and the United 
States can ever completely understand each other " (Peterson and Shimada 
1978). Studies in the following five research areas are particularly relevant.
Interpersonal Orientation 
   Most of the literature summarized in later sections suggests that negotiators 
will adjust their behavior from one situation to another. However, Rubin and 
Brown(1975) imply that people with a low interpersonal orientation (IO) will 
behave consistently across intra and intercultural situations. They suggest that 
a high (IO) person is "responsive to the interpersonal aspects of his relationship 
with others. He is both interested in, and reactive to, variation in the other's 
behavior." Alternatively, a low IO is "characterized, first and foremost, by a
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nonresponsiveness to the interpersonal aspects of his relationship with the 
other... " (Rubin and Brown 1975, pp. 158-159). 
   Thus, one might conclude that some people will behave in the same way no 
matter who is on the other side of the negotiation table-someone from the same 
culture or someone from a different culture. Graham and Herberger (1983) carry 
this idea one step further when they suggest that American negotiators 
naturally tend to be low IOs :
I am what I am. Few Americans take pride in changing their minds, even in 
difficult circumstances. Certainly John Wayne's character and behavior 
were constant and predictable. He treated everyone and every situation 
with his action-oriented, forthright style. He could never be accused of 
being a chameleon.
   So an explanation for ethnocentricity and obstinacy at the international 
negotiation table is offered. However, most of the rest of the pertinent literature 
argues that behavior changes will occur across the two settings, and for a variety 
of reasons.
Negotiator Similarity 
   The present study provides an excellent opportunity to test Evans' (1963) 
"similarit
y hypothesis." Evans' ideas-"the more similar the parties in a dyed 
are, the more likely a favorable outcome, a sale"-have stimulated a series of 
studies investigating relationships between similarity and a variety of nego-
tiation outcomes. Weitz (1979), in his excellent critical review of this stream of 
research, concludes that support for Evans' similarity hypotheses is weak, and in 
some cases, flawed by confounds. However, the previous work provides an 
important background for the issues to be considered here. 
   McGuire (1968) cites a "considerable body of evidence" and posits the 
mechanism underlying the influence of similarity :
Presumably the receiver, to the extent that he perceives the source to be like 
himself in diverse characteristics, assumes that they also share common 
needs and goals. The receiver might therefore conclude that what the source 
is urging is good for "our kind of people," and thus change his attitude 
accordingly. (p. 187)
   Evans (1963), Davis and Silk (1972), and Bagozzi (1978) all discuss at some 
length the relationship among similarity, attraction, and outcomes. Implied in
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Evans' work is a causal relation among the three constructs. With attraction 
intervening : similarity- attraction-outcomes. Thus, negotiators in same cul-
ture dyads might be expected to be more attracted to partners and achieve 
higher negotiation outcomes-profits and satisfaction. 
Communication Problems 
   Closely related to the issue of negotiator similarity are intercultural 
communication problems. Everyone writing in the area of international 
negotiations reports substantial communication problems at the negotiation 
table which often lead to undesirable outcomes for one or both parties (cf Sawyer 
and Guetzkow 1965; or Rubin and Brown 1975). Condon's (1974) views are most 
insightful-he classifies intercultural communication problems into four 
categories : 
   1. Language and language behavior; 
   2. Nonverbal behavior; 
   3. Values ; 
   4. Patterns of thought. 
   Condon adds that these categories might be considered in order of ascending 
perplexity. That is, misunderstandings at the level of language are often obvious 
and most easily corrected. Misunderstandings at the lower levels are seldom 
obvious to the participants in an interaction. 
   Empirical support for Condon's views is broad. Of particular interest is an 
article by Graham and Andrews (1987) which describes in depth how 
communication problems, at all four levels, result in undesirable outcomes for 
Americans negotiating with Japanese business people. It follows then that 
negotiation outcomes will be less favorable in intercultural negotiations because 
communication problems are much more likely to occur. 
Reciprocity and Interactional Synchrony 
   A series of studies by social psychologists and sociolinguists suggests that 
negotiators in a dyad tend to imitate one another's behaviors and balance 
individual negotiation outcomes. Gouldner (1960) explains that a "reciprocity 
norm" establishes a stable set of mutual rewards that guides interactions such as 
negotiations. Putnam and Jones (1982) report that reciprocity is more evident in 
integrative message patterns than in distributive strategies. Walton and 
McKersie (1965), Rubin and Brown (1975), and Pruitt (1981) all describe a 
tendency of negotiators to match one another's bargaining strategies. 
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   Even deeper than Gouldner's reciprocity norm are the unconscious influ-
ences of concepts of interactional synchrony and emotional contagion. Condon 
(1968) and others have reported that a speaker's body movements are coor-
dinated with one another and coordinated with the articulation of speech. 
Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson (1994) describe in great detail the evidence that 
humans naturally mimic those with whom they interact. 
   Therefore, based on these concepts of reciprocity, synchrony, and emotional 
contagion negotiators in intercultural interactions might be expected to adapt 
their usual intracultural behaviors to more closely reflect those of their foreign 
counterparts. Likewise, outcomes of intercultural negotiations may reflect a 
compromise between results typical of the differing intracultural styles.
Acculturation Theory 
   Acculturation theory suggests what might happen at the point of culture 
contact. That is, what will result from the mix of negotiation and communi-
cation styles? 
   Acculturation theory is a "mature" paradigm in anthropology. It received 
the most attention during the 1930s and 1940s. This attention was primarily a 
response to problems with Indian peoples in the Americas and problems of 
British colonial rule. The questions were : To what extent can indigenous 
peoples be assimilated into "advanced" cultures, and how might this process of 
assimilation be facilitated? The most widely accepted definition of accul-
turation is that of Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits (1936). "Acculturation 
comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having 
different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent 
changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups." 
   The difference between the acculturation paradigm and more recent social-
psychological models is the units of analysis. Acculturation theory has really 
been applied in a macro sense, the units of analysis being entire cultures. The 
units of analysis in social psychology have been the individual or, at most, small 
groups. 
   Acculturation theory fits the specific situation of intercultural negotiations 
very well. Acculturation theory is particularly useful if process measures are 
selected as the dependent variable. That is, what factors will determine which 
parties will adopt which negotiation and communication styles, given that these 
styles are culture specific? 
   Certainly, the most obvious example is language. What language will be 
spoken during intercultural negotiations? Will one party adopt the language of 
the other party? The circumstance of Japanese and American intercultural
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negotiations is interesting. Most often, English is the language spoken during 
the negotiations between Japanese and Americans. Part of the explanation is 
that the Japanese possess greater linguistic abilities than Americans. Japanese 
schools teach and emphasize English. However, in the long term, the most 
important explanation is the power-differential, both economic and military. 
The Japanese emphasis on learning English can be attributed in large part to the 
American occupation following World War II. Additionally, until recent times, 
Japan has been economically dependent on the United States. However, there 
are exceptions. For example, it is common practice for high-level Japanese 
executives to use interpreters, even though they may speak and understand 
English. Here the use of interpreters is expressive of the person's power. 
Further, with the increasing economic interdependence of recent year, changes 
are taking place. Japanese businessmen now complain about Americans' 
ignorance of Japanese business customs. 
   All the theories suggest generally that behavior will be different in cross-
cultural negotiations. Adler and Graham (1989) have provided information on 
how Japanese and Americans adjust their behavior during cross-cultural 
negotiations. The current study is an extension of that work wherein a model of 
negotiation processes is tested using cross-cultural interactions as the context.
THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
   The theoretical model depicted in Figure 1 is identical to that tested in 
Graham, Mintu and Rodgers (1994) and Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt (1996). 
Because their conceptual development is complete, we will only summarize it 
here. 
   Two dependent constructs are used in the study : (1) Individual profits 
attained by bargainers in a negotiation simulation : and (2) satisfaction of their 
partners measured using a post-exercise questionnaire. 
   The first independent variable considered is a problem-solving approach 
(PSA). A PSA involves first an emphasis on questions and getting information 
from clients about their needs and preferences. Second, once the other's 
requirements and circumstances are fully understood, the negotiator then 
accommodates the product or service offering to the client's needs. The focus is 
on cooperation and an integrative approach, wherein the needs of both parties 
are discussed and eventually satisfied. Despite a variety of labels used for the 
PSA concept (e. g. cooperative orientation by Rubin and Brown 1973, or 
representation bargaining strategies by Angelmar and Stern 1978), most 
researchers have reported a positive relationship between PSA and negotiation
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Negotiators' Role 
(buyer or seller) 
   B/Sn
Antecedent
H6
  Partners' 
Problem-Solving 
  Aproach 
   PSAp
H1
H4
 Negotiators' 
Problem-solving 
  Approach 
   PSAI
H3
(-)
H2
Negotiators' 
Attractiveness 
  ATT.
Concurrent
H5
Neogotiators' 
 Individual 
  Profits 
   $n
Partners' 
Satisfaction 
 SATp
Consequent
Figure 1 Model of Negotiations
outcomes. 
   H 1. Negotiators' individual profits are positively affected when partners use 
       strategies that are more oriented toward problem solving. 
   H2. Partner's expressed satisfaction with agreements is positively affected 
       when negotiators use strategies that are more oriented toward problem-
       solving.
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In the former case, bargainers who encourage targets to provide information 
about themselves and their needs and preferences can be expected to achieve 
higher negotiation outcomes. 
   Walton and Mckersie (1965) suggest the opposite of PSA strategies is 
distributive or individualistic bargaining strategies, the goal of which is to 
change a target's attitudes, attributions, or actions. Promises and threats are 
examples of distributive or instrumental appeals (cf Angelmar and Stern 1978). 
Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest that distributive strategies induce concession-
making by the other party. Consequently, bargainers using distributive or 
instrumental strategies can be expected to achieve higher individual negotiation 
outcomes, or, 
   H3. Negotiators' individual profits are negatively affected when negotiators use 
       strategies that are more oriented toward problem-solving. 
   Another relationship to be investigated in this study is the influence of 
negotiator's approach (i. e., behaviors and attitudes) on partner's negotiation 
approach. Rubin and Brown (1975) suggest the importance of adjusting one's 
bargaining tactics based upon impressions of opponents. Pruitt (1983) and 
Walton and Mckersie (1965) are among several other researchers who describe a 
tendency of negotiators to imitate or match one another's bargaining strategies. 
Although empirical support for these latter propositions is limited at best, the 
following hypothesis is suggested : 
   H4. Negotiators use of strategies that are oriented toward problem-solving 
       positively influences partners to use strategies that are oriented toward 
       problem-solving. 
   The reader will appreciate the importance of the structural relations 
presented in Figure 1 and the necessity of the partial least squares analysis. For 
example, as conceived, the relationships represented in Hypotheses 3 and 4 
should suppress the relationship represented by Hypotheses 1 (cf Bagozzi 1980). 
That is, the correlation coefficients may actually be understating the true 
relationship. A simultaneous equation approach will help to sort out which 
relations are the most meaningful within the complex model proposed. 
   Another important concurrent construct is attractiveness of the negotiator 
(here we do not consider physical attractiveness, but rather ask questions about 
interest and comfort levels between negotiators). Graham (1986) has shown 
target attractiveness to influence source's satisfaction positively in a negotiation 
simulation. Rubin and Brown (1975), in their review of the negotiation litera-
ture, conclude that, generally, interpersonal attraction enhances bargaining 
outcomes. Therefore, to the extent that a person receives social rewards from a 
relationship with an attractive other, that person will be more satisfied with the
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relationship (or the negotiation agreement). 
   H5. Partners' satisfaction is positively affected by negotiators' attractiveness. 
   The final relationship represented in Figure 1 is between role of the nego-
tiator (i. e., buyer or seller) and individual profits. Status and role (cf. Rubin and 
Brown 1975) have been found to influence negotiations. In associated studies, 
Graham et al. (1994) have found that in some countries buyers tend to achieve 
higher profits than sellers. 
   H6. Buyers achieve higher individual profits than do sellers.
METHODOLOGY
Participants 
   Forty-two American and forty-two Japanese business people participated 
in this study. All had been members of executive education programs or 
graduate business courses and had an average of greater than 8 years business 
experience. On average, the participants were over 30 years of age, and at least 
45% of their work involved contact with people outside their respective firms. 
Table 1 reports the demographic characteristics and the corresponding means 
and standard deviations of the variables of interest.
Negotiation Simulation 
   The negotiation simulation, developed by Kelley (1966) and used by Clopton 
(1984) involves bargaining for the prices of three commodities. Each bargainer 
receives an instruction sheet, including a price list with associated profit for each
Table 1 Group Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics, means (s. d.) 
                     Japanese Negotiators American Neotiators 
                  Intracultural Intracultural Intracultural Intracultural 
                   (n=44) (n=42) (n=42) (n=160)
Age 
Years of Work Experience 
Percentage of Work Involving 
Contact with People Outside Firm 
Individual Profits ($) 
Satisfaction (SAT), 
aJ=.82, aA=.86 
Problem-Solving approach (PSA) 
a=.63, aA=.83 
Negotiator Attractiveness (ATT) 
aj=.77, aA=.73
36.8 ( 5.1) 
13.1( 5.5) 
51.8 (19.9)
47.9 ( 7.7) 
3.8a ( 0.9)
10.3 ( 2.2)
12.0 ( 2.0)
30.4 ( 4.0) 
8.4( 8.3) 
57.9 (25.7)
43.2 (11.6) 
14.4( 3.1)
10.4( 1.8)
12.6 ( 2.0)
33.2 ( 9.0) 
9.8 ( 8.6) 
46.3 (32.3)
48.5( 9.7) 
16.3 ( 2.9)
9.8 ( 3.0)
12.4 ( 2.5)
32.8 ( 9.50) 
9.6 ( 8.1 ) 
51.7 (30.3 )
44.9 (11.1 ) 
14.6( 3.2 )
9.6 ( 2.6 )
11.9 ( 2.3 )
a single item masure of SAT for Japanese intracultural
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price level. Participants are allowed 15 minutes to read the instructions and plan 
their bargaining strategies. Though simple enough to be learned quickly, the 
simulation usually provides enough complexity for one-half hour of interaction. 
Within the one-hour time limit, bargainers use face-to-face, flee communication. 
No explicit rewards (e. g., grades, money) were associated with performance or 
participation in the simulation. Several other negotiation and bargaining 
simulations were considered, but Kelley's game was selected primarily because it 
best simulates the essential elements of actual commercial negotiations observed 
in preliminary field research, including multiple issues (i. e, integrative and 
distributive) and the potential for a variety of negotiation strategies including 
log-oiling and cooperation (Pruitt 1983).
Data Collection Instruments 
   After the bargaining session, each individual completed a questionnaire. To 
ensure equivalence, the Japanese translation of the simulation instructions and 
questionnaire were back-translated into English by different translators, and 
then the original and back-translated versions were compared and discrepancies 
resolved. 
   We considered two negotiation outcome variables. Negotiators' individual 
profits ($n) were derived directly from the agreed-upon bargaining solutions. 
Partners' satisfaction (SATp) with the negotiation was measured using a single 
item included on the postsimulation questionnaire. 
   Process-related measures also were derived from post-exercise question-
naires. Participants rated their own PSA bargaining strategies. Finally, partners 
rated the interpersonal attractiveness (ATTn) of their respective negotiators.
Data Analysis 
   The measurement problem was attacked first by calculating Cronbach or 
reliability coefficients (a is a measure of the intercorrelation of the separate items 
in each scale, that is, a measure of the internal consistency of multiple item 
measures) as suggested in Davis, Douglas, and Silk (1981). See Table 1. The 
three-item PSA scale performed rather poorly regarding absolute a scores and 
the comparative criterion outlined by Davis, Douglas, and Silk (1981) (i. e., scores 
should be greater than 65 and overlap with 90% confidence intervals of the 
original scale, in this case English). 
   Loading pattern coefficients (estimates of the coincidence of the separate 
items in a single measure) and parameter estimates were calculated for each 
cultural group using partial least squares (PLS). Then the statistical significance 
of the parameter estimates was determined using a maximum likelihood
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estimation technique (Joreskog and Sorbom 1981), with the PLS latent variable 
correlation matrix as input, to calculate the t-value for each parameter estimate. 
The significance levels present some evidence that relationships do exist, in fact, 
as opposed to the hypotheses that they are the results of a spurious arrangement 
(Fornell and Robinson 1983). 
   Using PLS as the analysis approach is appropriate for three reasons. First, 
using PLS, parameters can be estimated independent of sample size. Given that 
sample size varies for our four groups from 160 to 42, PLS seems more 
appropriate for parameter comparisons across groups than LISREL (a less 
flexible structural equations program) by itself Second, PLS avoids parameter 
estimation biases inherent in regression analysis (Fornell, Rhee, and Yi 1991) and 
some of the restrictive assumptions underlying LISREL (Fornell and Bookstein 
1982). Third, and perhaps most important, PLS provides the most flexibility 
regarding measurement of the constructs. That is, in both correlation and 
regression analyses, additive scales must be used as measures of the PSA and 
ATT constructs. . LISREL can be used with either additive scales or with a 
reflective indicator measurement approach wherein each item is modeled as on 
of a set of multiple indicators of an unobservable construct. Using LISREL, the 
internal consistency of the measures (i. e., degree of correlation between the 
separate items) can be determined simultaneously with parameter estimation. 
   PLS allows not only for additive scales and reflective indicators but also for 
a formative indicator measurement approach. In a formative indicator model, 
individual items are viewed as representing multiple causes ofthe constructs. 
This is an important distinction as Fornell and Bookstein (1982, p. 441) describe :
...unobserved constructs can be viewed either as underlying factors or as 
indices produced by the observable variables. That is, the observed 
indicators can be treated as reflective or formative. Reflective indicators are 
typical of classical test theory and factor analysis models ; they are invoked 
in an attempt to account for observed variances or covariances. Formative 
indicators, in contrast, are not designed to account for observed variables ; 
they are used to minimize residuals in the structural relationship.
RESULTS
   In Table 2 are reported the findings of the study. Columns II and In include 
the results from the analyses of the intercultural data collected for the current 
study and columns I and IV include results reported in previous papers (i. e., 
Graham, Mintu and Rodgers 1994; and Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt 1996).
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Table 2 Results, PLS Parameter Estimates (using formative indicators) 
    Japanese Negotiators American Neotiators
I. Intraculturala 
   (n=44)
II. Intracultural 
   (n=42)
III. Intercultural 
   (n=42)
IV. Intracultural 
   (n = 160)
H1 
H2 
H3 
H4 
H5 
H6
 PSAp - $n 
 PSAp - SATP 
 PSAp () $n 
 PSA,, - PSAp 
 ATTN - SATP 
 B/Sn - $n
- .09 
- .07 
- .15 
  .36** 
  .39** 
  .43**
.18 
.24 
.31** 
.52** 
.52** 
.16
.06 
.16 
.04 
.26* 
.67** 
.08
  .28** 
 .14* 
- .01 
  .29** 
  .39** 
  .19**
R'-$. 
R2-SATP
.27 
.16
.24 
.32
.01 
.50
.10 
.18
a measures of SAT using a single item 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 
   Hypothesis 1 was supported only for the American intracultural negotia-
tions (column IV). Negotiation partner's problems solving oriented strategies 
appear to have had no effect on negotiator's profits in the other three circum-
stances. 
   Hypothesis 2 was weakly supported for the American intracultural nego-
tiations (column IV). In the other circumstances a negotiator taking a problem-
solving approach appeared to have had little effect on partner's satisfaction. 
   Hypothesis 3 was not supported for any of the circumstances. Indeed, 
contrary to the stated hypothesis, when Japanese negotiators used more 
problem-solving oriented strategies they achieved higher individual profits. 
   Both hypotheses 4 and 5 were supported across all circumstances. Nego-
tiation partners tended to reciprocate negotiator's problem-solving strategies. 
Negotiator's interpersonal attractiveness was found to strongly influence 
partner's satisfaction levels. 
   Hypothesis 6 was supported only for the intracultural negotiations. Role of 
the negotiator (i. e., buyer or seller) appears to have made no difference in 
negotiator's profits in intercultural negotiations. 
   The hypothesized model explained substantial portions of the variation in 
negotiation outcomes for the Japanese bargainers in the intercultural 
negotiations-individual profits = 24 % and partner Satisfaction= 32%. The 
model explained little with regard to American's profits in the intercultural 
negotiations, but half of the variation in partner's satisfaction, i. e., 50%.
Post Hoc Analyses 
   Given the surprisingly poor performance of the model in explaining 
American's performance in the intercultural negotiations, other potential causal 
factors were considered. In particular, the post-negotiation questionnaire
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included a measure of extroversion/introversion (Eysenk's six-item scale, 1958) 
which proved to be salient in previous analyses (e. g., Graham 1985). American's 
who were more introverted based upon the Eysenk scale achieved significantly 
higher individual profits when negotiating with Japanese (r= -.36, p < 0. 05). 
Extroversion/introversion was unrelated to individual profits in the other three 
circumstances.
DISCUSSION
   Reciprocity and imitation seem to be operating in all circumstances. 
Although communication theory suggests that intercultural misunderstandings 
will cause all kinds of problems in negotiations, bargainers in both cultures 
appear to be able to size up (either consciously or unconsciously) the strategies 
of their negotiation partners and adjust their own behavior accordingly. The 
concepts of interactional synchrony and emotional contagion seem to be 
supported in our study. 
   The effects of interpersonal attractiveness appears to be a cultural universal, 
at least across the intracultural negotiation settings in the fourteen cultures 
reported in Graham et al. (1994) and Graham and Mintu-Wimsatt (1996), and the 
two intercultural settings examined here. Indeed, interpersonal attraction seems 
to be an even more important determinant of overall satisfaction in Japanese/ 
American intercultural negotiations than in the respective intracultural 
negotiations. It is also of interest to note that Japanese negotiators who were 
more extroverted (Eysenk's scale 1958) were more interpersonally attractive to 
their American counterparts in the intercultural negotiations (r= . 35, p< 0. 05). 
   For the Japanese negotiating with Americans things appears to be different 
in two major respects (compare columns I and II in Table 2). First, when 
Japanese work together, role is the most important issue-buyers achieve higher 
profits than sellers. This key relationship disappears in the intercultural 
negotiations. Indeed, in the intercultural negotiations, PSA strategies take on a 
new importance for the Japanese. The Japanese taking a problem-solving 
approach achieved higher individual profits, while there is no such relationship 
between the constructs in the intracultural data. Sharing information seems to 
be a key factor in their negotiations with Americans. 
   Things are also different for the Americans when they bargain with 
Japanese (compare columns III and IV). The importance of role is also dampened 
in the intercultural interactions, but it was never such an important factor in 
negotiations between Americans anyway. More importantly the influence of the 
Japanese partner's PSA strategies has no effect on the American's individual
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profits. Reciprocity still seems to be at work, but the informativeness of the 
Japanese partner appears to be of little direct economic benefit. Rather, the 
Americans who keep their mouths shut, the introverted ones, seem to achieve 
higher profits when working with Japanese.
Conclusions 
   Clearly in this study we are just scratching the surface of a wonderfully rich 
and interesting kind of human behavior-face-to-face international negotia-
tions. Cultural differences seem to be key. A variety of other methods will be 
useful in the continuing study of the topic-game theory, experiments, field 
interviews and observations, and videotaping of simulated negotiations. Con-
tributions can be made using a variety of perspectives-business, sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, communications theory, and socio-linguistics. For-
mer U. S. Ambassador to Japan, James Hodgson, has described culture as the 
"thicket" which must be traversed on the way to fruitful Japanese/American 
cooperation. His metaphor implies the hard work necessary for all of us to gain 
mutual international understanding.
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